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Banking ethics 
Introduction 
A bank may be broadly defined as a financial institution which is licensed as a taker 
of deposits and which makes loans and provides other financial services to its 
customers.  The term covers a wide variety of institutions that differ greatly in size 
and nature – not only historically but also geographically, and within a particular 
country. 
Most countries have a central bank, which usually has macro-economic 
responsibilities (especially related to monetary policy), acts for the government in 
other ways (e.g. managing the public debt), regulates banks and other financial 
institutions, and acts as a lender of last resort to the banking system.  Examples 
include the Federal Reserve Bank in the USA and the Bank of England in the UK.  
The operations of central banks are a specialized topic in their own right and will not 
be addressed in this chapter.  However, their regulatory role is of some relevance 
below. 
There are various ways of categorizing banks other than central banks.  One 
distinction of particular significance in the USA is between investment banks and 
commercial banks – a distinction employed by the US Glass-Steagall Act 1933 (a 
consequence of the Great Depression), which separated their activities.  An 
investment bank supports and advises on corporations’ capital market activities, 
including mergers and acquisitions.  A commercial bank is an institution that accepts 
deposits of money, makes loans using a proportion of those deposits, and offers 
related products and services, usually of a financial nature.  Although this chapter is 
about banking in general, its focus will be upon commercial banking. 
Some definitions of commercial banks, particularly in the USA, emphasize the receipt 
of deposits from, and lending to, businesses, whereas others include institutions that 
perform similar transactions with individuals or households – so-called ‘retail banks’.  
For the purposes of this chapter, the broader definition will be used.  In any case, in 
many parts of the world, commercial banks, in the narrow sense, and retail banks do 
not exist as distinct entities, and the manner in which the discussion in this chapter is 
framed can be applied to both. 
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Through their financial intermediation and other activities, commercial banks play a 
major part in modern economic life.  Their problems towards the end of the first 
decade of the 21st century attest to this.  Intimately involved in so much economic 
activity, a reduced ability to function on their part is like reducing the supply of 
oxygen to the economic body.  And if they fail – as history demonstrates they are 
prone to do, especially if appropriate regulations and safeguards are not in place – the 
consequences can be severe, not only for their own shareholders and customers, but 
also for businesses and households not connected with the failed bank; even for 
governments and nation states (Iceland is a recent example). 
Although simple in its basic form, commercial banking is a complex professional 
activity, and like many such activities it entails significant technical and ethical issues.  
The technical issues that revolve around managing the process of financial 
intermediation are introduced, quite briefly and in general terms, in the next section.  
Taking as a springboard the simple model of financial intermediation developed in 
that section, the principal ethical issues involved are then discussed in three 
subsequent sections, organized according to three terms – integrity, responsibility, and 
affinity. 
Commercial Banks and Financial Intermediation 
Commercial banks (hereafter referred to simply as ‘banks’) undertake a variety of 
activities.  Many offer a wide range of financial products and services (for example, 
financial planning, pensions, mutual funds, insurance) to their customers.  From the 
customer’s point of view, this can make life simpler; from the bank’s commercial 
perspective, it is a means of improving profitability through cross-selling.  Both the 
products and services themselves, and the approach to selling them, entail ethical 
issues.  However, at the heart of banks is their banking activity, and in order to stay 
within scope and at an appropriate length, that will be the focus of this chapter.  Thus 
this chapter is about banking rather than the complete range of activities undertaken 
by banks. 
The core of banking is financial intermediation.  A bank can be described as a 
‘middleman’ or a bridge between those with surplus funds (savers) and those who 
require credit (borrowers), whether for consumption, working capital or investment 
purposes.  In attracting funds, commercial banks offer a variety of products, including 
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checking (or current) accounts and savings (or deposit) accounts.  Checking accounts 
rarely offer significant interest, but they have associated benefit and services, and 
many banks charge for the services attached to such accounts.  Savings and similar 
accounts that offer interest differ from checking account in two significant ways.  
First, they usually do not have services directly associated with them.  Second, those 
that offer higher interest rates tend to require notice to be given before withdrawals 
can be made; or, at least, some interest already earned is relinquished if a speedier 
withdrawal is required. 
Similarly, banks lend on a variety of bases and terms, including overdraft facilities 
associated with checking accounts, and term loans.  Traditionally, the granting of 
credit has depended on the exercise of professional judgment by skilled professionals, 
but increasingly in recent decades the process has been automated by the use of credit 
scoring.  Nevertheless, judgment is still involved, especially for large and non-routine 
lending.   
Generally speaking, whatever the method by which the interest rate is set, the higher 
the perceived risk, the higher the interest rate that will be charged – which means that 
those who are probably least able to pay interest face the greatest interest rate burden.  
Risk is inherent in lending; the only way to avoid it is not to lend – which is what 
banks are choosing to do when they turn down a request for credit, at any price.  
However, risk is not the only issue that impacts whether, and at what rate of interest, a 
bank is willing to lend.  For a given level of risk, the size of the loan also has an 
impact, with small loans tending to be ‘priced’ higher (i.e. a higher rate of interest 
charged) than larger loans because of the bank’s fixed costs of arranging and 
managing a loan.  Very small loans, which may be all that a poor person needs or can 
afford, tend to be uneconomic for mainstream banks.  This can push the poor towards 
using more expensive or unlicensed lenders – so-called ‘loan sharks’ – which adds to 
their financial difficulties.  One response to this has been the development of 
‘microfinance’, the most well known example of which is Grameen Bank.  Although 
outside the scope of this chapter (see Chapter 22), microfinance is worth noting as an 
essentially socially or ethically motivated response to the perceived failure of banks to 
cater for the needs of the poor.  However, some mainstream banks provide assistance 
for microfinance operations. 
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In addition to pricing for risk, banks also pursue various means of reducing it, 
providing safeguards if the borrower defaults on the payment of interest or the 
repayment of the principal, or is likely to do so.  One is the use of third party 
guarantors, who stand behind the borrower.  Another is for the bank to take security or 
collateral, often in the form of a fixed charge on a specific asset or assets of the 
borrower.  Mortgage loans are a familiar form of this.  Where the borrower is a 
corporation facing bankruptcy, having security or collateral places the bank ahead of 
general, unsecured creditors. 
The process of financial intermediation can be illustrated by means of a simple 
diagram (see Figure 1).  Savers make deposits at the bank.  Since not all savers are 
expected to withdraw all their funds at the same time, the bank is able to lend on a 
proportion of the funds it has received, while keeping a smaller proportion to be able 
to pay savers who wish to reduce or withdraw their deposits.  The bank makes its 
margin by charging borrowers, on average, a higher rate of interest than it pays, on 
average, to savers.  This margin is intended to cover not only the bank’s operating 
expenses but also losses incurred when borrowers default and fail to pay some or all 
of the interest and principal they owe. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. A simple model of financial intermediation 
 
The process underlying this simple model will be familiar to most readers, but it is 
worth spelling out its essential nature, since it will be drawn on in the remainder of the 
chapter.  As indicated already, the bank can be seen as providing a bridge between 
saver and borrower.  One of the central features of modern capitalism is the way in 
which much financial capital is freed from ties of family, clan, tribe and even nation.  
Banks use money received from savers and lend it, generally subject only to financial 
considerations, to borrowers with whom the savers have no connection.  Exploiting 
Savers Bank Borrowers 
Deposits Loans 
Interest and 
withdrawals 
 
 Interest and 
repayments 
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their access to a wide pool of borrowers and using their expertise in assessing and 
managing lending activities, banks help to ensure that surplus funds are put to 
financially productive use – subject, of course, to an appropriate level of risk.   
However, it is not just a question of acting as a conduit between two parties.  A bank 
can take many small deposits (e.g. from households) and transform them into large 
loans (e.g. to companies), thus mobilizing savings to contribute to economic growth; 
this is a major function of banks within an economy.  A second transformation is also 
involved; borrowers usually borrow for much longer periods than depositors are 
willing to commit their funds for.  Again, this is an economically valuable 
consequence of the bank’s financial intermediation, though it also exposes it to 
significant financial risk. 
For the saver/depositor, the financial intermediation engaged in by the bank provides 
not only expertise in the use of the funds, but also benefits such as liquidity (they have 
access to their funds without depending on payments by particular borrowers) and 
diversification of risk (they effectively have a tiny share in a large portfolio of loans).  
In this sense, the bank acts not only as a bridge but also as a shield; it breaks the direct 
relationship between savers and specific borrowers.  To change the metaphor again, 
the bank also acts as a veil, since depositors in general have little or no knowledge of 
the purposes for which their money has been lent or who has borrowed it. 
The above paragraph sets out the basic social benefit of banking; the mobilization and 
transformation of savings to be used in economically productive ways, as reflected in 
the ability of borrowers to pay interest.  However, as the financial crisis of the latter 
part of the 21st century’s first decade has shown, there are significant negative 
consequences when banks, for whatever reason, fail or encounter severe difficulties in 
honoring their debts to their depositors.  Recent events are just one more episode in a 
long history of banking crises.  Regulators attempt to prevent bank failures by such 
means as specifying capital adequacy ratios so that banks do not over-extend 
themselves by lending too much.  Yet even an apparently strong bank can be brought 
down by a ‘run’ on it, when a large proportion of savers seek to withdraw their funds 
simultaneously when they lose confidence in the bank’s financial stability – a self-
fulfilling prophecy, of course.  Regulators seek to prevent such panic occurring by 
various means, and in many regimes smaller deposits are guaranteed by the state.  
While beneficial to the stability of the banking system, this is counter-productive if 
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extended to a 100% guarantee of all deposits, because big savers then have no 
incentive to make intelligent decisions about where to deposit their money, instead 
simply seeking the highest return, perhaps offered by a less reliable, indeed risky, 
bank.  There is a sense in which judging the soundness of a bank, including the 
control of moral hazard (see Chapter x), is a task best performed by a combination of 
regulators and relatively well informed depositors.  
Thus, the net contribution of banking to society can, in its broadest sense, be viewed 
as a balancing act between, on the positive side, productive financial transformations 
brought about through financial intermediation, and, on the other hand, economic and  
social disruption if the process goes wrong on a significant scale.  
In addition to bringing out the basic nature of banking, Figure 1 also helps to frame 
the remainder of the chapter as the principal ethical issues relating to banking are 
explored.  The next section examines the ethical issues on the left hand side of the 
model.  In particular, it examines the generation of trust that is necessary for savers to 
hand over their money to a bank.  The section after that considers various possible 
responsibilities that a bank might have in relation to its lending activities – thus 
focusing on the right hand side of the model.  The final main section then considers 
how some depositors might have more highly developed and nuanced interests or 
concerns regarding borrowers or the purposes for which their money is lent, thus 
‘reaching across’ the bank ‘bridge’ or ‘seeing through the veil’. 
Banking on Integrity 
As indicated in the previous section, deposits are needed for the process of financial 
intermediation to take place.  Indeed, historically banking developed from the 
custodial role of looking after other people’s money.  Given the exposure or 
vulnerability of those who deposit their money at a bank, the most obvious door 
through which ethics enters banking is trust.  In entrusting their funds to a bank, 
depositors are relying upon both the technical competence of the bank (not to lend 
recklessly, to collect payments etc.) and the integrity of the bank not to abuse its 
position – a position not only of holding the money, but also of possessing significant 
expertise and information not held by depositors.  This latter characteristic, 
information asymmetry, is common to situations of moral hazard where a lay person 
engages with a technical or professional expert.   
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Depositors, then, can be harmed both by technical incompetence and by a lack of 
integrity.  A ‘good’ example of the latter within recent memory is the case of BCCI 
(Bank of Credit and Commerce International), which engaged in fraudulent activity 
on a large scale.  Typical of the former is when a bank is weakened because a large 
proportion of its loan book is subject to default – though, as noted earlier, it is 
depositors’ perceptions of likely problems that may be most influential regarding bank 
failure.  However, one of the features of the recent banking crisis is the way in which 
some of the problems have arisen because of a move away from the traditional model 
of financial intermediation.  First, some lenders, instead of relying upon savers’ 
deposits, attempted to fund their operations by borrowing on the money markets or by 
relying on brokered deposits, which often entailed high rates of interest.  This saved 
them trouble and expense in terms of retail operations and was effective – until the 
money markets became tighter and interest rates rose.  Second, some lenders 
securitized bundles of loans and sold them off to other ‘lenders’, thus disconnecting 
information gathering and processing in the lending decision from the creation of 
assets.  A combination of the ‘market for lemons’ (Akerlof, 1970) and the ‘winner’s 
curse’ (Thaler, 1988) (bundles of loans were effectively auctioned off) left many 
institutions with assets that were worth much less than they had thought, especially 
when the financial crisis hit. 
The difference between technical competence and ethical integrity is largely a matter 
of intentions (Provis, 2001).  Professional bankers are well aware of the importance of 
integrity for generating trust.  ‘Since its earliest beginnings banking has been 
perceived as a business which depends on mutual trust and personal integrity’ (Lynch 
1991: 3).  Although personal integrity is an issue, for the depositor, the personal 
qualities of their contact person (if any) at the bank are not sufficient.  When you lend 
money to a relative or friend, you are trusting a person, whereas when you deposit it 
at a bank, you are trusting an institution – and the regulators (such as a central bank) 
that stand behind it.  Such a shift in trust from people to institutions is part of the 
condition of modernity (Giddens, 1990).  The institution or system needs to be 
trustworthy, though that does not mean that the personal qualities of individual 
bankers are irrelevant.  In this context, it is instructive to note the everyday use of the 
phrase ‘bank on’ to mean to rely upon. 
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One of the ways in which banks have responded to the challenges of engendering trust 
on the part of savers is in making more explicit the behavior that might be expected of 
them, for example through codes of ethics (see Chapter 16; also Cowton and 
Thompson, 2000).  Regulators are also important, seeking to prescribe and proscribe 
certain behaviors of banks and providing a degree of protection for depositors through 
their monitoring and deposit guarantee activities.  Sometimes ethics and regulation are 
viewed as substitutes for each other, particularly when regulations are extended to 
remedy a perceived lack of ethics, perhaps in the context of some scandal; witness 
calls for more regulation when it is felt that banks have not acted with integrity.  
However, the relationship between banking ethics (at the level of the individual, the 
bank, or the industry) and external regulation is more complex than this. 
Writing detailed rules for complicated businesses, such as banks, where the pace of 
change is so great and opportunities for moral hazard abound, is very difficult.  
Indeed, encouraging a rule-based approach can be ultimately self-defeating, since it 
can lead to a compliance-focused, ‘hollowed out’ approach to banking, where what is 
not forbidden is assumed to be permitted.  What is more likely to help generate trust 
on the part of depositors is to treat ethics (or self-regulation) and external regulation 
as complementary rather than as substitutes for one another.  Thus initiative for the 
development and maintenance of trustworthy behavior on the part of banks is best not 
left solely to regulators but is to be welcomed when it emanates from the banks 
themselves, either collectively or individually.  Indeed, given uncertainty and fear 
about banks’ trustworthiness and reliability, developing a good reputation is probably 
an astute competitive move on the part of an individual bank.  Howard Davies, former 
Chairman of the UK’s Financial Services Authority, considered an ‘ethical, 
responsible culture’ a ‘win-win’ for financial services firms (Davies, 2001: 284) and 
in that context it has been interesting, therefore, to see some commercial banks – 
those that felt able to do so – emphasizing their trustworthiness in promotional 
campaigns during and following the recent financial crisis.  Of course, there is the 
question of whether such claims themselves are to be trusted, but – without delving 
too deeply into an argument familiar in the business ethics literature – it is at least the 
case that the most sustainable basis for developing a reputation for being trustworthy 
is to behave with integrity, rather than just talk about it. 
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To summarize, integrity is important in banking, helping to generate the trust that is 
vital for a banking system to flourish.  It is important that depositors trust banks, 
otherwise there is no money to lend.  In the following section I move on to 
characterize some of the ethical issues that arise in the context of lending that money. 
Lending with Responsibility 
In acting with integrity and competence towards people who deposit money with 
them, banks should lend responsibly, in the sense of managing the risk and return 
characteristics of the loan book so as not to put depositors’ savings at undue risk.  In 
this regard, depositors’ interests are broadly aligned with those of shareholders.  
However, banks can be argued to have further obligations, including to stakeholders 
other than depositors and shareholders.   
Responsibilities may change in nature or emphasis over time.  Many of those faced by 
banks are faced by other large commercial enterprises too – for example, to be a good 
employer, a prompt payer of debts, or a fair competitor (Lucas, 1998).  However, 
some are specific to banks, or are particularly pertinent for them.  Before examining 
some of them in greater depth, it is worth emphasizing that any conception of a 
company’s social responsibility must start with the nature of its business and the 
social contribution that that business makes.  Thus, for example, while corporate 
philanthropy might be regarded as one component of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), it is just one part.  On occasions it even seems to be used as a smokescreen, as 
an attempt to disguise or at least ameliorate the problematic nature of a company’s 
business or the manner in which it pursues that business.  Returning to the point made 
earlier, banks’ fundamental contribution to society is bound up with the beneficial 
effects of the improved use of surplus funds brought about through competent 
financial intermediation.  If they do not succeed in that, they fail in their contribution 
to society, whatever the other trappings of CSR they might display. 
Nevertheless, between the broad issue of the general contribution of banking and the 
responsibilities that might be attributed to all or many types of business corporation, 
there remains a set of particular issues related specifically to banking.  These are 
focused on the right hand side of Figure 1 and are concerned with a bank’s activities 
as a lender. 
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First, particularly given the important role that bank finance plays in many societies, 
banks can be argued to have a responsibility not to exclude certain groups.  This 
includes a responsibility to lend fairly.  The danger is that banks’ lending policies, 
where they are unnecessarily restrictive, will tend adversely to affect certain groups 
which are denied credit or cannot afford credit on the disadvantageous terms on which 
it is offered to them.  This might prevent those groups from participating in economic 
life in various desirable ways or drive them to ‘loan sharks’ and their ilk.  Exclusion 
can happen in various ways, some more deliberate or explicit than others.  It might 
occur, for example, through the so-called ‘red lining’ of certain geographical areas or 
the refusal to lend to certain ethnic groups. 
Of course, if it is assumed that banks are responsible institutions that seek to maintain 
their depositors’ trust and to earn money for their shareholders, then it might be 
concluded that any apparent patterns of exclusion exist only because of simple 
business considerations.  However, this can be questioned on several grounds, 
including that some banks’ lending policies – formal or informal – seem to be 
unjustifiably discriminatory not just in moral (and legal) but also in financial terms.  
At best, it can be viewed as a kind of laziness not to look more carefully at a particular 
segment of the market; at worst, it can be viewed as something more perniciously 
prejudicial. 
Second, having lent money, the responsibility of banks can be argued to include not 
being too hasty to foreclose.  Although calling in a loan can be supported in ethical 
terms as protecting depositors’ funds and shareholders’ capital, banks should not be 
over-zealous in seeking to safeguard their position.  In other words, they should 
withdraw lending with some consideration for the consequences for other 
stakeholders – not just for borrowers, but those indirectly affected too.  For example, 
if a bank calls in a loan from a small firm, it is not only the firm concerned that is 
affected, but also its network of suppliers and customers, its employees and other 
business contacts – with both economic and social consequences.  The fear is that 
some banks seek to withdraw too quickly, at the first possible sign of trouble.  Since 
they do not share in any upside in the firm’s performance, there is a temptation for 
downside possibilities to dominate the decision about whether to continue lending. 
Third, as Morison (1995) argues, lending too much is potentially as serious a problem, 
ethically, as lending too little.  There is a connection with the previous point here in 
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that, if too much is lent, then foreclosure is much more likely.  Nevertheless, the two 
are worth distinguishing, for a bank’s approach to foreclosure is not necessarily tied to 
its approach to lending; both may vary according to the degree of profligacy or 
leniency versus stringency or aggression displayed.  Borrowers clearly have a major 
responsibility in deciding how much to borrow, but so do banks, both in how they 
encourage borrowing and in how they exercise their expertise in sanctioning loans – 
bearing in mind that if they are taking security, they might be harmed less than others 
if things go wrong.  In other words, if banks can protect their downside risk 
reasonably effectively, especially if a relatively high rate of interest is in prospect, 
they might be more willing to lend to vulnerable borrowers than a proper regard for 
the interests of those borrowers (and others indirectly affected) would allow. 
Finally, beyond issues relating to borrowers, there are questions about the purposes 
for which loans are made.  In particular, in common with other large corporations, 
banks have been prompted to consider their impact on the natural environment, 
variously conceived as (for example) sustainability, climate change or carbon 
footprint.   Like other businesses, banks have a direct impact on the environment (e.g. 
through their use of stationery and occupation of office buildings).  However, they do 
not – for example – clear rain forests or produce hazardous chemicals; their direct 
impact is limited compared to many businesses.  Their indirect impact, though, is 
substantial (Thompson and Cowton, 2004).   
As explained earlier, banks are involved in an incessant search for profitable lending 
opportunities, and if their industrial borrowers are engaged in activities that 
significantly and negatively impact upon the environment (especially if the cost is 
externalized), then the banks are implicated.  Given the way in which they transform 
small, liquid savings into large, long-term loans through financial intermediation, 
banks make possible industrial activities that would otherwise likely not occur or 
would occur on a smaller scale.  Put another, more positive way, commentators have 
viewed bank lending as an important lever for limiting or changing business behavior.  
Thus, for example, the UNEP Statement by Financial Institutions on the Environment 
& Sustainable Development is a significant element of the work of United Nations 
Environment Program; about 170 financial institutions were signatories at October 
2009 (http://www.unepfi.org/signatories/statements/fi/).  This is one method of 
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encouraging banks not to make loans without considering the environmental 
consequences of their lending. 
This section has focused on the right hand side of the model, discussing some of the 
ways in which a bank might be considered to act more or less ethically, or 
responsibly, in its lending behavior, going beyond what might be considered 
necessary to protect the legitimate interests of depositors (and shareholders).  It has 
suggested that there are certain responsibilities in the lending process, which might be 
seen as prima facie duties (Dancy, 1991).  The section has covered both the treatment 
of those to whom money is – or is not – lent, and the purpose for which it is lent, 
focusing on environmental impact.  Such concerns might be expressed by any 
observer of the lending process.  However, in the next section I wish to turn to the 
possibility that some depositors, as participants in the process, have a direct, ethically 
motivated interest in the direction in which their money is loaned or the uses to which 
it is put.  Such depositors have some sense of responsibility for, or affinity with, the 
use of their deposits.  This involves certain deliberate modifications to the 
conventional financial intermediation process. 
Banking with Affinity 
The model of financial intermediation presented in Figure 1 separates the saver from 
the borrower.  As explained earlier, the bank sits in the middle of two decoupled 
processes, with a veil of ignorance – to borrow a well-known philosophical phrase – 
between depositor and borrower.  However, some depositors are uncomfortable with 
this, and various developments have occurred that offer the potential for concerned 
savers to deposit their funds with a clear, or clearer, conscience.  Such depositors are 
seeking to make an association, even though there is no direct financial link, between 
their funds and the loans made by the bank. 
I refer to these various initiatives as ‘affinity’ banking.  Lynch (1991) calls similar 
practices ‘viewpoint banking’.  I use the term ‘affinity’ for two principal reasons.  
First, in various fields it stands for relationship by choice, a mutual attraction or 
resemblance, and hence it seems ideally suited to the coming together of like-minded 
parties around a values-based or values-influenced financial intermediation process.  
Second, it is already familiar in a financial context (at least in some countries), 
referring to credit cards that are associated with a particular organization.  The card is 
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‘branded’ with the affinity organization’s name and logo, and payments are made to it 
by the card issuer, usually based on initial take-up of the card and usage.  Many types 
of organization, are involved, but amongst the most prominent beneficiaries of these 
schemes are charities (Cowton and Gunn, 2000; Schlegelmilch and Woodruffe, 1995; 
Worthington and Horne, 1993). 
Some banks have a lending policy that is avowedly ethical or ‘responsible’, going 
beyond the more general ethical codes and environmental policies already referred to.  
A good example is that of the Co-operative Bank in the UK.  Its Ethical Policy was 
launched in 1992, capitalizing on the Bank’s historic roots in the co-operative 
movement.  The Policy, which is now incorporated into the Bank’s Partnership 
Approach, continues to be refined in response to customer opinion and changing 
circumstances.  It sets out whom the Bank will and will not do business with.  For 
example, the Bank states that it will not supply financial services to any organization 
or regime which oppresses the human spirit, takes away the rights of individuals or 
manufactures any instrument of torture.  Nor will it provide financial services to 
tobacco product manufacturers.  More positively, it will encourage and seek to do 
business with companies that avoid repeated damage to the environment.  The 
approach is thought to have been a major factor in the Bank’s success in capturing 
market share since it was introduced (Cowton and Thompson, 1999; Davis and 
Worthington, 1993; Harvey, 1995; Kitson, 1996; Thompson, 1999), including 
significant growth in the charities sector (Cowton et al., 2000).  Savers attracted to the 
Bank because of its stance on various issues are expressing a view not only on its 
trustworthiness as a custodian of funds, but also on the uses to which those funds are 
put.  The Bank’s policy provides an opportunity for some savers’ ethical values to be 
more closely aligned with the characteristics of the loan book than is the case with 
most other banks. 
The Co-operative Bank can be depicted as ‘a conventional bank with an ethical 
emphasis’ (Cowton and Thompson, 1999: 10).  However, there are other examples of 
banks or related financial initiatives, many of them of quite recent origin, which seek 
to go further than the Co-operative Bank in expressing through their product offering 
a particular set of values or beliefs.  The Europe-based Triodos Bank is an instructive 
example.  Triodos has an overarching policy to finance projects ‘which benefit the 
community, enhance the environment and respect human freedom’.  This policy 
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determines the types of project which the Bank will and will not finance, but Triodos 
pushes affinity much further than the Co-operative Bank.  First, because it is relatively 
small, it is able to provide more detailed information to its depositors about where 
money has been lent, thus providing an unusually high level of transparency.  Second, 
within the envelope of its standard social and environmental lending criteria, Triodos 
gives depositors opportunities to specify more precisely the uses to which they wish 
their funds to be put, through particular accounts, the money in which is then ring-
fenced.  Examples of areas of application include organic farming and social housing.  
Thus Triodos Bank manages to restore a sense of relationship between depositor and 
borrower which, as explained earlier, tends to be broken in normal banking practice.  
(For further details see Cowton and Thompson 1999, Chapter 12; Cowton and 
Thompson 2001.)  Another interesting feature is that, although the Bank’s policy is to 
offer relatively attractive rates of interest, in many cases depositors elect to receive a 
lower rate of interest than the official rate on the account, in some cases waiving it 
altogether, thereby helping the borrower by permitting funds to be lent on at favorable 
rates of interest (‘interest offset’).   
Explicit or implicit interest offset is seen in several other affinity initiatives, which 
might therefore seem to be as much about personal philanthropy as banking or 
conventional saving.  For example, Shared Interest (Cowton and Thompson 1999: 
Chapter 9; Moore 1993) seeks to lend to Third World producers while providing a 
very low return to savers.  Such schemes, which emphasize social rather than financial 
return, pose little threat to mainstream banking because, even though they are growing 
significantly, in terms of total finance they are miniscule.  Nevertheless, they are still 
of relevance to mainstream banks.  First, they provide opportunities for collaboration 
which might help to deflect some criticisms of mainstream banks; for example, they 
might support, financially or technically, an organization that has a remit to lend to 
the poor.  Second, the initiatives might be regarded as experiments or sources of ideas 
for schemes which might subsequently be adopted by mainstream banks in some 
form. 
Finally, although there is not enough space within this chapter to do it justice, mention 
should be made of the growing phenomenon of Islamic banking.  In some cases this is 
practiced by an independent Islamic bank, in other cases by an Islamic banking unit or 
subsidiary of a conventional bank, with the Islamic component financially ring-
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fenced.  Islamic banking is widely interpreted to mean a ban on the charging or 
receipt of interest (Riba), in accordance with Islamic law (Shariah) – though, as in 
historical debates within Christianity, there is some discussion of whether it is really a 
matter of not charging excessive interest, or usury. 
As indicated in Figure 1, the flow of interest payments is central to the financial 
intermediation process that lies at the heart of conventional, ‘Western’ banking.  In 
Islamic banking, this is replaced by alternative mechanisms, including the payment of 
fees and the sharing of profits and losses or risks, under various financial contract 
forms (e.g Mudharabah, Musharakah, Mudaraba) – though some commentators are 
not convinced that all banking services and products marketed as ‘Islamic’ are really 
compliant with Shariah.  However, it is not only interest that is forbidden (Haram) in 
Islamic banking.  Attention is also paid to the activities that are being undertaken; for 
example, all dealings in gambling, pornography, alcohol and intoxicants are 
forbidden, so loans should not be made for those purposes.  Overall, Islamic banking 
involves not only a constrained financial intermediation process, in terms of the 
direction of lending, but a different type of intermediation process in terms of the 
nature of the flow of payments between the bank, its depositors and borrowers.  
Growing rapidly both in predominantly Muslim nations and amongst Muslim 
communities in other countries, Islamic banking poses an interesting challenge to 
models of banking focused solely on interest and risk. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to provide an overview of ethics in banking by focusing on 
the core process of financial intermediation that banks engage in through accepting 
deposits from savers and lending to borrowers who seek credit.  I have used three 
terms to frame the discussion of some of the salient issues in banking ethics.  First, 
integrity (in addition to technical competence) is important to generate the trust 
necessary for savers to deposit their funds with banks.  A minimum level is necessary 
for any banking system to flourish and so make its fundamental contribution to the 
economy and society, with banks using information and expertise to channel funds 
appropriately to economically productive uses.  Second, responsibility highlights 
contemporary banks’ need to take into account the consequences of their lending 
policies.  I highlighted four prima facie duties: not to exclude certain classes of 
customers unfairly; not to foreclose too hastily; not to lend profligately; and not to 
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lend without consideration of environmental consequences.  Third, and finally, affinity 
refers to a set of relatively novel ways in which depositors and borrowers can be 
brought closer into closer association than they are in conventional Western banking, 
such that the process or outcomes of financial intermediation explicitly align with the 
depositors’ ethical values. 
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